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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-1951 
___________ 
 
CRAIG SAUNDERS, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
PHILADELPHIA DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE; FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF PENNSYLVANIA COURT REPORTERS, DIGITAL RECORDING AND 
INTERPRETER ADMINISTRATION; SHARON GERMAN, Official Court Reporter;  
BARRY HARRIS, Official Court Reporter; DIANE S. RAQUET, Official Court 
Reporter 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2:11-cv-06327) 
District Judge:  Honorable Petrese B. Tucker 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
September 26, 2013 
 
Before:  HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed October 21, 2013) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
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PER CURIAM 
 Craig Saunders, a Pennsylvania state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from the 
District Court’s order dismissing his civil rights complaint, as well as from the court’s 
subsequent order denying his motions to alter or amend the judgment and file an 
amended complaint.  Because the appeal presents no substantial question, we will 
summarily affirm. 
I. 
 In 2002, Saunders was charged with a host of offenses in the Philadelphia Court of 
Common Pleas.  His first trial ended in a mistrial, but his second trial ended with him 
being found guilty of kidnapping, rape, and several other offenses.  After the Court of 
Common Pleas imposed sentence, Saunders filed a direct appeal.  In 2006, the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the judgment of sentence.  Thereafter, Saunders 
filed a petition for relief under Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 
 Shortly after commencing his PCRA action, Saunders filed a civil rights complaint 
in the District Court.  Therein, he alleged that the trial judge in his criminal case, along 
with the City of Philadelphia and certain court personnel in the First Judicial District of 
Pennsylvania, had deprived him of the trial transcript from his first trial and other 
documents necessary to establish his innocence at his second trial and on direct appeal.  
In 2008, the District Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint, 
concluding that the favorable termination rule of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 
(1994), barred Saunders’s action.  Saunders appealed from that judgment, but we 
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dismissed his appeal as frivolous.  See Saunders v. Bright, 281 F. App’x 83, 85 (3d Cir. 
2008) (per curiam).     
In 2010, the Court of Common Pleas rejected Saunders’s request for PCRA relief 
on the merits.  In 2011, at which point Saunders’s appeal from that decision was pending 
before the Superior Court,1 he filed another civil rights complaint in the District Court.  
This new complaint named as defendants the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office, 
three court reporters, and the Court Reporter, Interpreter, and Digital Recording 
Administration for the First Judicial District of Pennsylvania (hereinafter collectively 
referred to as “Defendants”).  Saunders alleged that Defendants had failed to provide him 
with a transcript of his accomplice’s trial or complete transcripts of his own two trials.  
He further alleged that Defendants’ actions (1) blocked his ability to access the courts on 
appeal and on collateral review, (2) violated his due process rights, and (3) violated his 
equal protection rights.  Saunders sought injunctive and declaratory relief.   
 Defendants moved to dismiss Saunders’s complaint on several grounds, including 
on the basis that the District Court lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine.  The District Court declined to address the grounds raised by Defendants and 
instead determined, sua sponte, that Saunders’s complaint failed to allege a constitutional 
violation.  On that basis, the District Court granted Defendants’ motion and dismissed 
Saunders’s complaint with prejudice, stating that the “allegations cannot be amended to 
allege a cause of action.”  (Dist. Ct. Order entered Sept. 27, 2012, at 3 n.1.)   
                                              
1 The Superior Court later affirmed the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas. 
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Saunders then filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure 52(b) and 59(e), as well as a motion for leave to file an amended 
complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a).  The District Court denied 
those motions.  In doing so, the court reiterated that amendment of his complaint would 
be futile.  Saunders now appeals. 
II. 
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise plenary 
review over the District Court’s dismissal of Saunders’s complaint.  See Belmont v. MB 
Inv. Partners, Inc., 708 F.3d 470, 483 n.17 (3d Cir. 2013).  We review for abuse of 
discretion the District Court’s denial of Saunders’s Rule 15(a) motion.  See Grayson v. 
Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).  Lastly, we review the District 
Court’s denial of his motion to alter or amend the court’s prior decision for abuse of 
discretion, except with respect to matters of law, over which our review is plenary.  See 
Max’s Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 
1999).  We may affirm a judgment of the District Court on any basis supported by the 
record, see Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam), and we 
may take summary action if an appeal does not present a substantial question, see 3d Cir. 
I.O.P. 10.6.   
To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain 
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
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550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 
liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Id.  In reviewing a district court’s dismissal for failure 
to state a claim, “we must accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in 
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable 
reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.”  Fleisher v. Standard Ins. 
Co., 679 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).     
As a preliminary matter, we note that, because the question of Rooker-Feldman’s 
applicability is a jurisdictional one, see Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d 
181, 192 (3d Cir. 2006), the District Court should have decided that question before 
addressing the merits of Saunders’s complaint.  See Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l 
Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430-31 (2007) (explaining that “a federal court generally 
may not rule on the merits of a case without first determining that it has jurisdiction”); 
see also Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 399 n.3 (1981) (stating that 
a “dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is 
a judgment on the merits”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  We need not disturb the 
District Court’s judgment on this basis, however, for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does 
not actually apply here.2  Accordingly, we now turn to the merits of Saunders’s 
complaint. 
                                              
2 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is confined to “cases brought by state-court losers 
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court 
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III. 
Saunders’s first claim alleged that Defendants, by failing to provide him with 
complete transcripts as requested, violated his First Amendment right to access the 
courts.  To state an access-to-the-courts claim, a plaintiff must “allege actual injury, such 
as the loss or rejection of a legal claim,” Oliver v. Fauver, 118 F.3d 175, 177 (3d Cir. 
1997), as well as show that this lost or rejected legal claim is non-frivolous or arguable, 
see Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam).  “[T]he underlying 
cause of action, whether anticipated or lost, is an element that must be described in the 
complaint, just as much as allegations must describe the official acts frustrating the 
litigation.”  Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002).   
Here, Saunders sought and received state court appellate review of his conviction 
and sentence.  He also pursued post-conviction relief, and the state court denied his 
petition on the merits.  Although Saunders’s complaint provided a detailed account of his 
efforts to obtain complete copies of the trial transcripts, he failed to state how the lack of 
complete transcripts hampered his ability to appeal and collaterally attack his conviction 
                                                                                                                                                  
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those 
judgments.”  Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).  
We have set forth four requirements that must be met for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to 
apply: “(1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff complains of injuries 
caused by the state-court judgments; (3) those judgments were rendered before the 
federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and reject 
the state judgments.”  Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 
159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Those requirements have not 
been met here.  Although Saunders attempted to obtain the transcripts at issue here during 
his direct appeal and on PCRA review, the instant action complains of injuries caused by 
Defendants, not the state-court judgments issued in those proceedings. 
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and sentence.  He also did not describe how having the complete transcripts would have 
affected the outcome of his litigation, nor did he establish that any lost or rejected claims 
were non-frivolous or arguable.  For those reasons, we agree with the District Court that 
Saunders’s complaint did not state an access-to-the-courts claim.   
Saunders’s complaint also alleged that Defendants violated his due process rights.  
As the District Court noted, due process requires that the Commonwealth make available 
“a record of sufficient completeness to permit proper consideration of [an indigent 
litigant’s] claims.”  Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 194 (1971).  However, 
“neither the Supreme Court, nor our Court, has held that due process requires a verbatim 
transcript of the entire proceedings or that an incomplete record confers automatic 
entitlement to relief.”  Fahy v. Horn, 516 F.3d 169, 190 (3d Cir. 2008).  Here, it appears 
that Saunders possessed a partial version of the transcript of his second criminal trial 
during the direct appeal of his conviction.  He later obtained a more comprehensive, but 
apparently still not complete, version of the transcript, as well as a partial transcript of his 
first criminal trial.  Nonetheless, his complaint did not allege facts indicating that the 
reviewing courts lacked a record of sufficient completeness to consider his claims.  
Therefore, we agree with the District Court that his complaint did not sufficiently state a 
due process claim.  
The last claim raised in Saunders’s complaint alleged that Defendants violated his 
equal protection rights.  Because his complaint failed to allege that Defendants treated 
him differently than similarly-situated individuals, we agree with the District Court that 
8 
 
his complaint failed to state an equal protection violation.  See Renchenski v. Williams, 
622 F.3d 315, 337 (3d Cir. 2010).  
Saunders also challenges the District Court’s refusal to grant him leave to amend 
his complaint.  A dismissal of a civil rights complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) without 
leave to amend is “justified only on the grounds of bad faith, undue delay, prejudice, or 
futility.”  Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 236 (3d Cir. 2004).  Here, the District Court 
dismissed Saunders’s complaint without leave to amend on the basis that Saunders’s 
“allegations cannot be amended to allege a cause of action.”  Even if the District Court 
erred by concluding that the defects in Saunders’s complaint could not be cured by 
amendment, any such error was harmless because, even if the District Court had 
permitted Saunders to file an amended complaint, it would not have changed the outcome 
of the case.  The amended complaint that Saunders attached to his Rule 15(a) motion 
failed to cure the defects in his complaint.  Notably, although the amended complaint 
included more detail about the underlying claims that Saunders was allegedly unable to 
pursue in his state court proceedings, it did not allege facts demonstrating that those 
claims were non-frivolous or arguable.  See Monroe, 536 F.3d at 205. 
In light of the above, we find no reason to disturb the District Court’s dismissal of 
Saunders’s complaint.  Nor has Saunders shown that he is entitled to relief from the 
District Court’s subsequent denial of his post-judgment motions.  Because this appeal 
presents us with no substantial question, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s 
orders.  See 3rd Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
